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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case N o . 890625-CA
Priority N o , 2

GREG N. OLIVER,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction :i s conferred 01 :i th i s Coi :ii: I: by Utah Code Ann.
section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less
than first degree felonies).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Was Mr. Oliver denied due process of Jaw and/or
effective assistance of counsel when the trial court denied trial
counsel's motion for a continuance, despite the fact that trial
counsel had done no preparation to try th i s case?
2. Should the theft charge have been reduced to a class A
misdemeanor because the State failed to present evidence proving the
value of the property in issue t-o bp at lets:! twin hundred
dollars?

inH fifty

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's denial of the motion to continue the
trial is reviewed for a clear abuse of the trial court's
discretion.

State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975).

Standards of appellate review of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are set forth in State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), as follows:
To determine if the trial court correctly
applied this [Strickland ineffective assistance]
standard, a reviewing court
may engage in its own independent review of
the district court's conclusion, because the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
presents a mixed question of law and fact.
If a state court has rendered specific
predicate factual findings, those findings
should be presumed correct unless conditions
exist which case those findings into doubt.
The district court's findings of fact,
however, are reviewable under the clearly
erroneous standard.
Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).
The trial court's findings of fact relating to the value of
the property are reversed if clearly in error.
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989).

State v. Johnson,

The jury's verdict on this

question is entitled to greater deference.

State v. Johnson. 774

P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The statutes and constitutional provisions to be relied on
are contained in either Appendix 1 or the body of the brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of burglary
and theft after a trial on September 5 and 6 of 1989, and sentenced
to the Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and
one to fifteen years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John H. Spielmans, former investigator and author of
presentence reports for the Utah Department of Corrections,
testified that on January 7, 1989, he and his son arrived home at
about 2:30 in the afternoon (T. 18-22).

He noticed that the door to

the garage, which door was normally locked at all times, was open
(T. 23). Mr. Spielmans went in the garage to investigate and
noticed something move outside the window in the garage (T. 24). He
saw a person ten to twelve feet away vaulting a chain link fence and
continuing northward (T. 24). Mr. Spielmans indicated that the day
was overcast, and that he was able to view the person vaulting the
fence "for a very brief period" (T. 24). Mr. Spielmans began
following the person but lost sight of him (T. 24).
Upon returning home, Mr. Spielmans saw that the front door
was mangled, and his son informed him that someone had been inside
the house (T. 25).
Mr. Spielmans called 911 on a cordless phone, as he walked
out on his driveway, where a neighbor approached and pointed out a
person pressed up against a wooden fence across the street (T. 26).
Mr. Spielmans thought the person against the fence was the same
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person he had seen vaulting the fence, noting the person's blond
hair, navy watch cap, and Levi jacket (T. 27). After some
hesitation, Mr. Spielmans headed toward the person, who moved
southward (T. 28). The person was in Mr. Spielmans' clear view as
the person moved toward his car and Mr. Spielmans chased him, and
when Mr. Spielmans reached the rear bumper on the driver's side of
the car, the person said to him, "It wasn't me, man." (T. 35-36).
The person then got in his car and drove away (T. 36). When the
person was speaking to Mr. Spielmans, Mr. Spielmans could see the
left profile of the person's face (T. 37). Mr. Spielmans called 911
again, giving the license plate, description, and direction of
travel of the vehicle he had just seen (T. 43).
When the officer from the Sheriff's office came to
Mr. Spielmans' home, Mr. Spielmans determined that a watch, a ring,
four one dollar bills, and four or five coins worth about seventy
five cents each were missing (T. 43, 71). At that time,
Mr. Spielmans estimated the value of the watch to be $125 and could
not remember what value he had placed on the ring, indicating that
the police report would contain the correct estimate on the value of
the ring (T. 48-49).

After an attempt to refresh his recollection

by viewing the police report, Mr. Spielmans could not recall the
value he placed on the ring, indicating that the police report was
accurate, but that he personally could not recall (T. 50).
Mr. Spielmans later discovered four or five Canadian dollars worth
about seventy-five cents a piece were missing (T. 71).
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When Mr. Spielmans checked the back of his home, he noted
that one of the sliding door locks was out of place and that there
were footprints in the snow heading northward (T. 51, 63).
The next day, a deputy sheriff came to Mr. Spielmans7 door
and showed him one photograph, and asked if the subject of the
photograph was the person who had burglarized Mr. Spielmans' home
(T. 52). Mr. Spielmans indicated that "it appeared to be."
(T. 52).
A week later, Mr. Spielmans was in the sheriff's office,
when they showed him a photo spread of six photos (T. 54).
Mr. Spielmans selected one of the photos, the center one on the top
row, indicating that that was the person he had seen vaulting his
fence (T. 54, 61).
It appears that the photograph that Mr. Spielmans selected
from the photo array was the exact same photo he was shown by
Officer Matthews the week before (T. 228).
A stipulation was entered into the record, indicating that
if a Detective Carr were called to the stand, he would testify that
he showed the same photo spread to Mr. Spielmans on January 10 and
that Mr. Spielmans selected the photo of Mr. Oliver (T. 127-128).
In April, Mr. Spielmans attended a lineup of six people,
selecting a person as the one who had vaulted his fence (T. 57).
In court, Mr. Spielmans identified Mr. Oliver, "Gentleman
in the ski sweater, the defendant[']s table," as the person he had
seen vaulting the fence (T. 58). Mr. Spielmans indicated that
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Mr. Oliver was also the person he had identified in the photo spread
and the lineup (T. 58).
On cross-examination, Mr. Spielmans indicated that his
description for the police indicated that the person was

,f

[m]ale,

white, wearing a blue navy watch cap, very blond hair protruding
from under it." (T. 61). He did not give a height or weight, and
noted that the person had a Levi jacket and gold wire-rim
clear-lensed glasses (T. 61-62).

Mr. Spielmans could not recall if

the person had any facial hair (T. 62). He did not recall if the
person had glasses on when he was entering his car (T. 64).
Mr. Spielmans indicated that as a result of having worked for
corrections, he was familiar with Mr. Oliver's name, but that he was
not told that Mr. Oliver was the person in the photo and photo
spread until after he was shown the photo spread (T. 68).
Mr. Spielmans indicated that he told his colleagues in the
intensive supervised parole unit about the events at his home, and
that those people were responsible for Mr. Oliver's arrest (T. 69).
Lou Carol Roberts, a neighbor of John Spielmans, testified
that on January 7, 1989, she saw a person running through her yard,
indicating that his car had broken down (T. 73-74).

She indicated

that she later told the police that the person had blond hair that
was short over the ears and longer in back, and did not give a
description of his clothing (T. 75). She went to the home of a
neighbor, Bob Borite, to discuss what she had seen, noticed the
person standing by a car, and wrote down the license plate number of
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the car (T. 76) . She indicated that as she was watching the person,
something startled him and he ran from the car (T. 76).
She ran to Mr. Spielmans7, telling him that the person was
trying to get into his car, and then Mr. Spielmans gave chase as the
person got into his car (T. 76). She did not hear the person say
anything as he got in his car (T. 77). She gave the license plate
number to Mr. Spielmans (T. 82).
Ms. Roberts was shown a photo spread either the day after
or a few days after, and selected a photo of the person she thought
was the person she saw in her back yard (T. 78). She indicated that
the photo she selected was the center one on the top row (T. 78).
When Ms. Roberts viewed the photo spread, she indicated that the
suspect might have been number two but that she was not exactly sure
(T. 125). Ms. Roberts attended the lineup and could not identify
anyone (T. 79). When the prosecutor asked her if she could identify
the person she saw running through her yard, Ms. Roberts said, "No,
it's been too long ago." (T. 79).
Ms. Roberts indicated that the officer did not come to her
home the day after the events and show her one photo (T. 80).
She indicated that she did not get a good look at the
person's face and did not know if he had any facial hair (T. 80).
When she was asked how she identified the person in the photo
spread, she indicated that only two of the people in the spread had
the right hair color, and only one had the right haircut (T. 81).
She did not remember the person wearing glasses (T. 82).
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Robert Rufener, another neighbor of John Spielmans,
testified that on January 7, at about 2:30, he heard his dog bark,
and looked out the window to see a person going through some yards,
getting in his car, and driving away (T. 83-85).

The person was

taller than Mr. Rufener, blond, with dark clothing and a mustache
(T. 89). Mr. Rufener also identified the same photo from the photo
spread as was identified by Ms. Roberts and Mr. Spielmans (T. 90).
Mr. Rufener attended the lineup that was held in April, identifying
a person but indicating that he was uncertain that the person was
the one he had seen in January (T. 92). He identified Mr. Oliver in
court as the person he had seen on January 7 (T. 92-93).
Mr. Rufener was not asked whether he had been shown the single
photograph.
Mr. Rufener indicated that the person he saw was not
wearing glasses (T. 93).
Another neighbor of Mr. Spielmans, John R. Call, testified
that on January 7, he was driving in his car and nearly hit a
pedestrian running from the Rufener property (T. 96). This person
was being chased by Mr. Spielmans (T. 97). The person was young
(late twenties to early thirties), athletic, with long, blond hair
(T. 98). The car was a grey two-door with a hatch back, and may or
may not have been spotted, as if in preparation for repainting
(T. 98-99).

When Mr. Call was shown the photo spread, he was

uncertain and could only identify two possible suspects (T. 99).
When Mr. Call attended the lineup in April, he did not identify
anyone and did not identify Mr. Oliver at trial (T. 99-100).
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Mr. Call was not asked if he was shown the single
photograph of Mr. Oliver.
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that
in investigating this case on January 7, he spoke with
Mr. Spielmans, his son, and Mr. Rufener (T. 103-104).

He indicated

that Mr. Spielmans' description of the person was "Male, white,
between the age of 25 to 30 years old, about five foot ten, 180
pounds, blond, curly hair, with wire rim glasses.

Suspect was

wearing black gloves, and ... a blue watchman type cap." (T. 105).
He said that Mr. Rufener gave the same description (T. 105).
Officer Matthews indicated that all of the witnesses gave
the same description of the car, that Mr. Spielmans indicated that
it was a white over red older Monte Carlo (T. 105). Mr. Spielmans
also gave the officer the license plate number of the car (T. 105).
Officer Matthews indicated that he interviewed Mr. Call, but was not
aware at that time that Mr. Call was a witness to the events in this
case (T. 106).
Officer Matthews traced the footprints in the back yard to
the Roberts' or Rufeners' yard (T. 107). Officer Matthews then
checked the license plate number and drove to the residence of the
registered owner (T. 108). As he approached the address of the
vehicle, he did not see the vehicle, but parked his car down the
street and approached a house next to the house of the registered
owner to investigate (T. 108).
As Officer Matthews spoke with the neighbors, he saw a
person matching the suspect's description exiting the home of the
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registered owner of the suspect car (T. 109). Officer Matthews saw
the person look at Officer Matthews and hurry to a car and leave
(T. Ill). The person and his friend who was with him both looked
shocked and left in separate vehicles (T. 112). Officer Matthews
identified Mr. Oliver as the suspect (T. 114).
Officer Matthews pursued the suspect, who was driving in a
green Oldsmobile Cutlass (T. 112), but lost him in a subdivision
(T. 116). The other person was driving a Ford Pinto (T. 112).
Officer Matthews had an idea that the suspect was Greg
Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of Mr. Oliver through the
records division of Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for
identification (T. 116). When asked if he showed the single photo
to any of the other witnesses, he could not recall (T. 116). He
indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph to
Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to believe
this may be the person that entered his residence earlier that day."
(T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if he could
identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans indicated, "That's
the guy." (T. 117).
Officer Matthews indicated that Mr. Spielmans was the only
witness he showed the single photo (as opposed to the spread), but
his police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their
residences, ...and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the
suspect in the burglary from a picture."

(T. 122-123).

Officer

Matthews tried to explain the discrepancy by noting that he may have
shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see anything
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(T. 122). When asked repeatedly about the discrepancy between the
report and his testimony, Officer Matthews would not commit himself,
answering with phrases like "I don't believe" and "all I remember"
(T. 123).
He indicated that he had been trained that photo spreads
are more desirable than photo showups, but indicated that he felt
that because Mr. Spielmans worked for Adult Probation and Parole,
and because Mr. Spielmans had indicated when reporting the burglary
that he probably knew the suspect from his work with Probation and
Parole, an exception would be appropriate (T. 124).
Vernon Beesley of the Sheriff's Office went to the
Spielmans' residence on January 7 and was unable to obtain any
useful fingerprints (T. 129-132).
Mr. Oliver testified that he had previously been convicted
of aggravated robbery, and that a year after the conviction, he was
acquitted when the actual robbers were caught (T. 149). He
indicated that he later altered a prescription and was returned to
the prison, with a sentence that expired in November of 1988
(T. 150). On January 7, Mr. Oliver weighed 159 pounds, his hair was
short, he had no mustache, and did not wear glasses (T. 150). He
indicated that previous to about July of 1989, he had never worn
prescription glasses (T. 151).
He testified that on January 7, 1989, he attended a baby
shower, arriving at noon or 2:00, and then drove in his Oldsmobile
to the store (T. 151). He indicated that a person named Quentin
borrowed Karen Weed's Monte Carlo, and told Mr. Oliver at about
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4:00 p.m. that he had run from the police in it that day because the
registration was not in order (T. 151-154).
Mr. Oliver described Quentin as almost six feet tall, with
long blond hair that is sometimes pulled up in a cap (T. 156).
Quentin did not tell Mr. Oliver about the robbery (T. 156).
Mr. Oliver indicated that as he left Karen Weed's house, he
saw a police car, but thought nothing of it, and did not make any
effort to evade the police (T. 155). The police car did not turn
its red light on (T. 156).
Three weeks later, Quentin went to Las Vegas (T. 163).
About a month after the baby shower, three parole officers arrested
Mr. Oliver (T. 157), but Mr. Oliver had no opportunity to tell the
police his side of the story (T. 163). Mr. Oliver did not
burglarize Mr. Spielmans' home (T. 157).
Karen Weed testified in rebuttal for the State.

She

indicated that on January 7, 1990, her Monte Carlo was brown with
grey primer spots and rust (T. 178). Mr. Oliver drove her to the
baby shower in that car on January 7 (T. 179). She indicated that
Quentin did not have permission to drive the Monte Carlo on the 7th
(T. 179).
After Mr. Oliver was arrested, he asked Karen to testify
for him that he was at the shower the whole time, but she did not
know if he was or was not there the whole time (T. 181). She
testified that Mr. Oliver had worn prescription glasses during the
five years that she had known him, and that on January 7, she
thought he owned a pair of gold rimmed glasses (T. 181).
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She described Quentin. as tail, skinny, with orange-red
shoulder length frizzy hair and lots of facial blemishes, and
indicated that he drove a 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass (T. 182). She
indicated that she and Quentin traded cars frequently and that her
registration was expired on January 7 (T. 182-183).
When defense counsel asked Ms. Weed about a previous
interview with the prosecutor and her previous recollection of the
car Mr. Oliver was driving on January 7 when he picked her up from
the baby shower, Ms. Weed indicated that she could not recall the
car because she was on drugs (T. 183-184).

Her children said that

he was driving her Monte Carlo (T. 184). She indicated that they
were in the Monte Carlo, but she had previously told the prosecutor
that they were driving Mr. Oliver's Oldsmobile (T. 185).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's denial of trial counsel's motion for a
continuance forced Mr. Oliver to be represented by counsel who had
done no preparation for the trial, in violation of Mr. Oliver's
rights to due process of law and effective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Oliver must be retried.
The State failed to present evidence that the value of the
property taken from the Spielmans' residence was at least two
hundred and fifty dollars. When the case is retried, the theft
charge must be reduced to a class A misdemeanor.
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ARGUMENT
I.
MR. OLIVER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND/OR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FORCED THE TRIAL TO PROCEED,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD
DONE NO PREPARATION.
On the first day of trial, Mr. 01iver/s trial counsel moved
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial." (T. 4 ) . The
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance,
indicating that although plea negotiations were continuing, the
trial court had informed the parties on the Friday before the
Tuesday trial that they should perform as if they were going to
trial (T. 8-9).
Defense counsel argued that it was unfair for defense
counsel to rely on the time frame for plea negotiations offered by
the State and to be forced to go to trial without time for
preparation (T. 7 ) . The prosecutor, Ms. Byrne, indicated at the
close of the State's case that she had contacted one of its
witnesses on Friday and told her she did not need to come because
Ms. Byrne anticipated the plea to be entered on Tuesday (T. 145).
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the
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denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver.

The record

indicates as follows:
One thing. I think it's almost obvious, but
sometimes obviousness gets lost in the record,
particularly when the trial records that is not
the one that handled things on appeal from the
plaintiff's perspective. Each of the witnesses
who testified yesterday, it seemed to me, that
there was full availability of cross-examination
by Mr. McCaughey and he took advantage of that.
One of the reasons why I wanted to make sure
whether or not Mr. McCaughey wanted the witnesses
back was in the event there was any appeal on
this question of a continuance, I want to make
sure the record is very clear that full
opportunity had been made available to the
defendant, to the witnesses, and all of which
indicates to me that where I think I'm absolutely
correct on denying the motion to a continuance,
even if for some reason I'm wrong, is it's very
clear that any error has been harmless in the
sense that full access has been had to witnesses,
and in fact, since the trial did not conclude in
the first day, that there has been extra time to
prepare, extra time to do whatever is necessary,
so that there's no conditions of denial on the
motion for continuance, except for moving the
case along, which is a bearable factor.
Furthermore, it appears to me that there may
have been some benefit in the sense that this
witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehman [State's
witness], is not available.
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I appreciate that with the
witnesses and making sure that we can have them
come back.
THE COURT: Do you want any witnesses back?
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I do not, your Honor
....

Sometimes you have to take advantage of the
record to express your feelings at the time, and
that's —
....

That's sort of what I was doing.
THE COURT: I'm not saying anything was
untoward. The record is there for a purpose.
You use it for the correct purpose. I believe I
use it for the correct purpose today.
(T. 146-147).
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A. PREPARATION OF THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE IS ESSENTIAL TO RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Procedural due process recognizes that a party must have
the opportunity to prepare a defense.

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d

1207 (Utah 1983).i
Several cases on the topic of effective assistance of
counsel2 recognize that trial counsel are expected to prepare to
defend a criminal defendant.
The need for preparation of the defense case was recognized
in State v. Tempiin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990).

The court

there began its analysis by quoting the basic Strickland test:
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Id, at 15, quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687
(L984).
The Tempiin court found that the first prong of the
Strickland test had been met because defense counsel had failed to

1. Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I section 7
of the Utah Constitution, and by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
2. The rights to effective assistance of counsel and to
present a defense are provided in Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
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procure defense witnesses to support Mr* Tempiin's testimony.

The

court stated,
If counsel does not adequately investigate
the underlying facts of a case, including the
availability of prospective defense witnesses,
counsel's performance cannot fall within the
"wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." This is because a decision not to
investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable
decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons.
Tempiinf

149 u t a h Adv#

Rep#

a t 16

(footnote, citation omitted).

The Tempiin court found that the second prong of the
Strickland test had been met in that case because the trial attorney
had failed to obtain defense witnesses that would have impacted on
the credibility of the two opposing witnesses in the case, and the
testimony of those witnesses would have impacted the
evidentiary picture.'"

n/

entire

Tempiin at 17, quoting Strickland at 696.

In Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court
explained,
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. In other words, counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.
Id. at 691.
In State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
this Court found that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
obtain pertinent bank records involved in the case, and in failing
to prepare defense witnesses for their testimony in court.
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After discussing the Strickland standards, this Court
quoted Jennings v, State, 744 P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), for
further explanation of trial counsel's duty to prepare:
"When counsel knows of the existence of a person
or persons who possess information relevant to
his client's defense and he fails to use due
diligence to investigate that evidence, such a
lack of industry cannot be justified as
'strategic error.' The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function
4-4.1, maintain that: "it is the duty of the
lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and to explore all
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits
of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction."
Id. at 1091, quoting Jennings at 214.

B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE FORCED
MR. OLIVER TO GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT PREPARATION OF HIS CASE, AND
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
When trial counsel was forced to go to trial without any
preparation (T. 4), Mr. Oliver was forced to go to trial in
violation of his right to prepare his defense, see Nelson v.
Jacobson, supra, and with representation falling below objective
standards of reasonable performance.

See Tempiin, Crestani, and

Strickland, supra.
Whether this Court views the violation in this case as a
due process violation, requiring error to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt,3 or as an effective assistance of counsel

3. See Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)(if
constitutional errors are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
reversal is required).
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violation, requiring error to undermine confidence in the verdict,4
Mr, Oliver is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court did not address the continuance issue in
terms of due process or effective assistance of counsel.

The trial

court did, however, conclude that Mr. Oliver was not prejudiced by
the trial court's failure to grant the motion for continuance,
because defense counsel had full access to the witnesses who
testified, because the trial ran overnight (allowing extra
preparation time), and because one of the State's witnesses was
unavailable to testify (T. 146-147).

The factual predicates of the

trial court's ruling are reviewable for clear error, and the legal
conclusions to be drawn from the facts in this case are open for
this Court's independent evaluation.

State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d

1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(citation omitted).
Several aspects of Mr. Oliver's case demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by the denial of the motion for continuance.

1- The trial court should have granted the continuance so defense
counsel could have supported Mr. Oliver's testimony about his
previous conviction based on misidentification.
As noted in the statement of facts, the prosecution of
Mr. Oliver was based primarily on the eyewitness identification by
four witnesses who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and
theft.

The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's

4. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)(denial of effective assistance of counsel requires reversal
if confidence in verdict is undermined).
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error.

The inclusion of proper support for Mr. Oliver's defense

concerning eyewitness misidentification could have "affected the
entire evidentiary picture," calling the verdict in this case into
question, Tempiin, supra. and cannot be considered harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Chapman, supra.

2. The trial court should have granted the continuance so defense
counsel could have fully explored and exposed the weaknesses in the
eyewitness identifications in this case.
a. Trial counsel could have addressed the prejudice arising from the
placement of the photo from the showup in the photo array.
At least one of the four eyewitnesses was shown a one
photo, mug shot showup the day after the crime, and was subsequently
shown a photo array and lineup, and identified Mr. Oliver as the
perpetrator of the crime in this case

(T. 52, 54, 58, 61, 116-117,

127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234).
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3).
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial,
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel.

The prosecutor

and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State's
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array,
and thought that the one photo from the showup had been lost
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4).
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Had the trial court granted adequate preparation time,
trial counsel could have reviewed the motion to suppress and
addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of
Mr. Oliver1s mug shot in the showup and then in the photo array.

b. Trial counsel could have addressed the possibility that more than
one of the State's witnesses were tainted by the improper, one photo
mug shot showup.
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification
(T. 116). He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph
to Mr.

Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to

believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier
that day." (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if
Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117). 6
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their
residences, ...and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the

6. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272).
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo
appeared to be the person (T. 52).
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Further, Officer Matthews' encounter with Mr. Oliver and
the subsequent investigation and prosecution may have been tainted
by the fact that when Officer Matthews was at the neighbors' house,
they informed him that their neighbor, Mr. Oliver, had recently been
released from prison (M.H. 261).
Had the trial court granted adequate preparation time,
trial counsel could have sought the evidence necessary to
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews'
credibility, and the identification procedures used in this case.
Particularly when combined with the other omissions of
preparation in this case, trial counsel's failure to procure and
present evidence to support Mr. Oliver's testimony and to contradict
Officer Matthews' testimony calls for a new trial under the
Strickland and Chapman standards.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
REDUCED THE THEFT COUNT TO A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-412 classifies theft according
to the value of property taken.

It provides, in part, as follows:

(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
....

(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services
is more than $250 but not more than $1,000;
....

(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was more than $100 but
does not exceed $250.
....
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When the officer from the Sheriff's office came to
Mr. Spielmans7 home, Mr. Spielmans determined that a watch, a ring,
four one dollar bills, and four or five coins worth about seventy
five cents each were missing (T. 43, 71). Mr. Spielmans estimated
the value of the watch to be $125, and could not remember what value
he had placed on the ring, indicating that the police report would
contain the correct estimate on the value of the ring (T. 48-49).
After an attempt to refresh his recollection by having him read the
police report, Mr. Spielmans could not recall the value he placed on
the ring, indicating that the police report was accurate but that he
personally could not recall (T. 50). Mr. Spielmans later discovered
four or five Canadian dollars worth about seventy-five cents a piece
were missing (T. 71). Mr. Spielmans never indicated personal
knowledge of the value of the ring, and the police report was not
admitted into evidence.

See State v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep.

26, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(police reports are not admissible under
business and public records exceptions to the hearsay rule in most
circumstances).

The ring was not presented in evidence.

Thus, it appears that the approximate value of the property
properly established by the State was $140.
When defense counsel moved for a reduction of the theft
charge to a class A misdemeanor, the court denied the motion,
finding that Mr. Spielmans had testified that the police report had
refreshed his recollection.

The trial court's finding is subject to

the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review, adopted from
interpretations of federal rules of civil procedure and discussed in
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State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

The standard was

explained in Walker as follows: "[I]f the findings (or the trial
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings (or
verdict) will be set aside."

Id. at 193. This court's review of

Mr. Spielmans' testimony will reveal that the trial court's finding
was clearly erroneous.

See Appendix 3, containing trial court's

finding and pertinent pages of Mr. Spielmans' testimony.
Even if this Court views the issue as the review of the
jury's verdict and applies the deferential standard of review
applicable thereto,

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989),

the evidence is insufficient.

Cf. State v. Ballenburger, 652 P.2d

927 (Utah 1982)(per curiam)(discussing modes of proof of value of
stolen property).

CONCLUSION
This Court should remand this case to the trial court for a
new trial, instructing on the importance of adequate preparation of
Mr. Oliver's defense.

Because the State presented evidence

supporting the misdemeanor theft conviction, rather than the felony
conviction, Mr. Oliver must be retried on the misdemeanor theft
charge.
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Respectfully submitted this ZLL-hL day of February,
1991.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and
that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114,
this JiCtt day of February, 1991.

DELIVERED by

this

of February, 1991.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

APPENDIX 2
MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

FILED
JAN9, 219911
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

ItoiyTNowan
Cte&e*$*e Court
UfthCwtftoi Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

GREG N. OLIVER,

MOTION FOR SUSPENSION OF
RULES, REMAND, AND STAY OF
APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS

Case No. 890625-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

A.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of Burglary

and Theft on September 5 and 6 of 1989, sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to fifteen
years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167).*
On the first day of trial, Mr. Oliver1s trial counsel moved
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and

1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to
as f,R.". The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress
will be referred to as MM.H.". The transcript of the trial
(contained in two volumes, numbered consecutively) will be referred
to as "T.".

consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial." (T. 4). The
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance
(T. 9).
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the
denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver (T. 146-147).
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to establish
that the denial of the motion for continuance resulted in the denial
of his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of
counsel.

This case involves a burglary and theft that occurred on
January 7, 1989 (R. 6-7). The prosecution of Mr. Oliver was
primarily based on the eyewitness identification of four witnesses
who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and theft.

The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's
eyewitnesses had misidentified him as the person in the vicinity of
•the burglary and theft—he testified that he had previously been
convicted of aggravated robbery on the basis of eyewitness
identification and that he was later acquitted of that conviction
when his innocence was established (T. 149) . His testimony on this
point was as follows:
Okay. Mr. Oliver, have you ever been convicted
of a felony?
Yes, I was.
When was that?
- 2

-

First, it was back in '83. I was convicted of
aggravated robbery, and the jury trial was
convicted because I have this blond hair. A year
later they caught the guys that did it, and I was
acquitted.
Okay.
They took me from prison and brought me back here
to jail, and I—in '82 I had mv right hand
severed off and I filled a prescription and—
Forged a prescription?
I altered it, I filled it. Somebody else forged
it. I filled it and the doctor give me Motrin.
Were vou convicted for that?
Yes. The put that—charged me in that and
convicted me of that and sentenced me back to
prison.
Then vou were on parole?
Yes. Thev let me out on parole after that. And
I expirated in November of '88.
(T. 149-150)(emphasis added).2
As is discernable from examination of the emphasized
portion of Mr. Oliver's testimony, supra, there were problems with
Mr. Oliver's credibility.

In addition to his admission that he had

been involved in and convicted of forgery, the jurors were also
faced with Officer Matthews' testimony that Officer Matthews had a
hunch that the offender in this case was Mr. Oliver (T. 116).
Officer Matthews also indicated that when Mr. Spielmans reported the
crime, Mr. Spielmans seemed to think that he knew the suspect from
his work with Adult Probation and Parole (T. 124).

2.

In closing argument, trial counsel argued, in part, as

follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Oliver, as he testified
was sent to prison once on mistaken identity.
And was released when they caught the right
person. I would ask you not let that happen
again, to review this evidence and bring back a
verdict of not guilty on both charges.
(T. 201).
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Trial counsel should have procured evidence to support
Mr. Oliver1s testimony.

A review of the district court pleadings

file in the 1982 case referred to by Mr. Oliver establishes that
Mr. Oliver was in fact convicted and that the conviction was later
set aside when the actual perpetrators confessed.

Trial counsel for

Mr. Oliver in the 1982 case indicates that the basis of that
conviction was misidentification of Mr. Oliver.

See Appendix 1,

containing the affidavit of counsel; Appendix 2, containing
certified documents from the district court pleadings file in the
1982 misidentification, aggravated robbery case; State v. Tempiin,
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(ineffective assistance of counsel
established when trial counsel failed to call witness to corroborate
defendant's testimony).
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification
(T. 116) . He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph
to Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason to
believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier
that day11 (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if
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Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117).3
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their
residences, . . . and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the
suspect in the burglary from a picture." (T. 122-123)(emphasis
added).

Officer Matthews tried to explain the report by noting that

he may have shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see a
suspect at the scene of the crime (T. 122). When asked repeatedly
about the discrepancy between the report and his testimony, Officer
Matthews would not commit himself, answering with phrases like "I
don't believe" and "all I remember" (T. 123) .
As is demonstrated by review of the record in this case,
trial counsel did not ask two of the four eyewitnesses if Officer
Matthews had shown them the one photo, mug shot show up of
Mr. Oliver prior to their exposure to the photo array, the line-up,
or Mr. Oliver's in-court appearance (T. 83-95; 95-102).
Trial counsel should have addressed the possibility that
three of the four eyewitnesses were improperly tainted by the one

3. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272).
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo
appeared to be the person (T. 52).
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photo, mug shot show up.4
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

As was discussed above, at least one of the eyewitnesses
was shown a one photo, mug shot show up the day after the crime, and
was subsequently shown a photo array and line-up, and identified
Mr. Oliver as the perpetrator of the crime in this case (T. 52, 54,
58, 61, 116-117, 127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234).
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3) .
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial,
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel. The prosecutor
and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State7s
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array,
and thought that the one photo from the show up had been lost
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4).

4. The eyewitness
one photo, mug shot show up
and did not identify anyone
questioned by the police or
the story (T. 151, 163).

who indicated that she was not shown the
identified Mr. Oliver in the photo array
at the line up or at trial (T. 78-80) .
given an opportunity to tell his side of
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Trial counsel should have reviewed the motion to suppress
and addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of
Mr. Oliver's mug shot in the show up and then in the photo array.
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

The essence of Mr. Oliver's view of the case was that he
was innocent and that his conviction was based on police misbehavior
and failure to investigate honestly.

He indicated that he was never

questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of
the story (T. 151, 163).
Although Mr. Oliver indicated that his parole had expired
in November of 1988 (T. 150), he was arrested by three parole
officers (T. 156-157).
He disputed Officer Matthews' testimony that Mr. Oliver had
evaded Officer Matthews during the investigation of the crime
(T.108-112), indicating that Mr. Oliver did not hear a siren, and
asking that Officer Matthews be recalled and asked if Officer
Matthews had turned his red light on (T. 155-156, 165). While
Officer Matthews testified that he saw Mr. Oliver exiting Karen
Weed's home during the alleged evasion, Mr. Oliver indicated that a
photograph of the scene would have shown that from where Officer
Matthews was standing, his view of Karen Weed's home was blocked by
a fence (T.160-161).
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Trial counsel should have sought the evidence necessary to
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews'
credibility and the identification procedures used in this case.
See Tempiin, supra.
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

B. LEGAL BASIS FOR ALLEGATIONS OF DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees all
people the right to due process of law:

"No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides more specific
protections to those accused of crime:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
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The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution provide the accused with rights to due process and
assistance of counsel.5
These constitutional provisions and the counterparts have
been interpreted and applied in contexts similar to the instant one,
and support Mr. Oliver's assertions that the trial court's denial of
the motion for continuance, trial counsel's lack of preparation in
this case, and improper identification procedures and other police
misconduct denied him due process of law and effective assistance of
counsel and void his convictions.

E.g., Nelson v. Johnson. 669 P.2d

1207 (Utah 1983)(component of due process is provision of adequate
time for preparation of defense); State v. Tempi in. 149 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(effective assistance of counsel requires

5.

The sixth amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides,
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
- 9
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investigation and preparation of defense); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d
432 (Utah 1989)(due process requires reliable eyewitness
identification). 6

CONCLUSION
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to determine
whether trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and
prejudicial, Strickland v. Washington; 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and
to determine whether the trial court's failure to grant the
continuance and the improper identification procedures require a new
trial in this case.
In the alternative, Mr. Oliver requests that the due date
for his opening brief be extended until fifteen days after
disposition of the motion to remand.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 1991.

C^BROOK
ijr) Mr. Oliver

6. Mr. Oliver is aware that in order to rely on the Utah
Constitution, he must present adequate briefing on the matter in the
trial court, State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986), and intends to
do so in the event that this Court grants the remand.
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DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

c^^-dav of January, 1991.

7
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Appendix 1
(to motion for evidentiary hearing)

ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GREG N. OLIVER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT

:

Case No. 890625-CA
Priority No. 2

ss:

I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK,_ declare under: penalty, of perjury
that the following is true and correct:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State

of Utah and employed as an appellate attorney at the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association.
2.

I am the attorney appointed to represent GREG N. OLIVER

in the above-captioned case during the pendency of his appeal.
3.

I was not present during the trial of this matter and

did not represent Mr. Oliver at trial.
4.

I have spoken with Robert N. Macri, the attorney who

represented Mr. Oliver in the aggravated robbery/misidentification
case documented in Appendix 2 to this brief.

5.

It is my understanding from talking to Mr. Macri that:
(a) in that aggravated robbery case, Mr. Oliver was

convicted on the basis of eyewitness identification
testimony of two witnesses;
(b) Mr. Oliver was later acquitted of that charge when
the real perpetrator of the crime was found.
(c) Visual comparison of Mr. Oliver and the
perpetrator of the aggravated robbery demonstrates
effectively Mr. Oliver's argument that eyewitness
identification/is unreliable.
DATED this

/ 1) day of January. 1991.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this JL22

January, 1991.

W ® 7

iSaolUtah

day of

—

,

jV^U Y^/A
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah

My Commission
Expires:
;ommission E2

4-£^3

- 2

-

Appendix 2
(to motion for evidentiary hearing)

In the District Court of Davis County
State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH

1

vs.
GREGORY NESS OLIVER

That whereas, said defendant-,

m

lg83

Case No. 4213

J

GREGORY NESS OLIVER

having heretofore on the 9 t h day of
Jiinfi
Having been convicted by a Jury
FIM4 G*Kir

JUL1

WCHAaaALLPHIN.Oerk
Davis County, Utah
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT TO THE
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff

_, Defendant

FILED

m

, A D. 19_B3_
of
the

^^ 3 ^

Havteff B M O w l e t * By • Jury

T»

Of

the charge of Aggravated Robbery, second degree felony
-

. ,

a, felony

NMW 1 OrtMM

and now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and ready for sentence, thereupon the
court renders its Judgment as follows:
YOU,

Gregory Ngsa O l i v e r

,

Having been convicted by a Jury
r%md GuUly

«r

§

^

^ ^

adjudBCS

having
y^ to

Havtac l m C—»m»* Uy a Jmty

be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the sentence of the law tliat you
Gregory Neas Oliver

for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of
JESE2

hi,!,,,,*.!. ~ ~

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said
Gregory Ness Oliver

be sentenced to imprisonment
In the Utah State Prison for a term of on* to fifteen yavBt
THE AMOUNT OF $550.00.
Jun

said sentence to begin as of
NOW, THEREFORE, you

*

ANP-PAY-RESTITUTIOK-IN

28

,

, 19JLL-

Crgyorv Neag O l i v e r

_ _

, the
H U M « PitaMNr

above named defendant , are remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Davis County, State of
Utah, to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah
State Prison in execution of this Judgment and sentence.
WITNESS: Honorable —Douglas L CoraabyJudge, and the seal of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the State of
Utah affixed this

28

day of _JH2£

, A D. 1 9 _ § i
JQPNEY W. WALKED
Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District in and for Davis County,
^ ^
State of Utaii.

By

^^^r^^r^^l

Received -ctfir*:Athi day of June, 1983, from Brant Johnson, Sheriff of Davis
County. ,Utah, the^ peraon of Gregory Neaa Oliver for the term of 1 to 15 Yre
at the* Utah Sta'te? Prison for Aggr. Robbery.
..,1. -iH'tiiA a iiAirji^

Also 1 Tr for Theft.

Kenneth V. Shulsen, Warden

•O
Beverley
I.D. 4

Officer

Circuit Court, State of Utah
Davis County, Bountiful Department

Commitment

STATE OF UTAH

GREGORY NESS OLIVER
Defendant

]
/

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
The above-named defendant has been charged with the crime of
THEFT

*r

BOUNTIFUL. DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH

A«-

JULY 15. 1980
(

_____

waimsanBMm^^

( X) The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of
<

00

and to be imprisoned in the county jail for______5
Q

days anc

days of the imprisonment was suspended upon payment of the fine

YOU ARE COMMANDED to take the defendant into your custody and safety keep the defendant:

( x) until he shall serve out the imprisonment of ____2£5

Special instructions:

days.

THTS TTME MAY BF SFRVFD mNrTTBEFNTT.Y WTTH ANY

JATT. SFNTFMPF nTSTPTrT pnTTRT MTCWT T F W AM MP fit TffW

DM TTTMF ? g

TF

Ml?

TWF

SFNTFMPF TM TUSTTjTCT TOTTBT TS T . " g TWAM 1 VPA P <

mMPT.FTF TWF VFAP r>M TWF SFMTFMPF OM TWTC r v i t r g

IQfl^

M TXTVV MTTCT

ROBERT MACRI, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
354 East 600 South
S a l t Lake City 84111
Tel 364-3018

. . %s

.-»<•»<

IN THE DAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
and NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.

No. Cr 4215

GREGORY NESS OLIVER,
Defendant

COMES NOW DEFENDANT GREGORY N. OLIVER, through his attorney of record, and
moves this Court for a new trial in the above captioned matter for the reason
that newly discovered evidence proves conclusively that Defendant did not
commit

the crime for which he.has Jbeen declared guilty and-confessiona.

obtained by Davis County law enforcement officials from the guilty parties
require that such new trial be granted.
Dated

?^

this 13th August, 1983.

•>w

/

Robert Macri
NOTICE OF HEARING
Please note that Defendant's Motion for New Trial will be heard Tuesday, August 16,
1983 in the above captioned Court at the hour of 1:30 P.M. or a3 soon thereafter
as same may be heard.
/A

f // ,

A

Certificate of Mailing
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial and Notice of
Hearing to Mr. Mel Wilson, Esq., Deputy County Attorney, Davis County Courthouse,
Farmington Utah 34025. postpaid this 13th^August, 1983.
.-C.--JT.4H

c.nj.»-->c? OAVIS

)
)

f

M

' . P i ^ S S a S i G N S D . CLERK OF THE DISTRICT
i.8-" ' v ? 0A'":Z COWlTY. UTAH DO HEREBY CEHr,."*"-'ri'"- " ~ L °" "* 0S 'S'HAL DOCUMENT ON
RL1 ,:4 M* '.«F?CS AS SUCH CLEPK
WITM5SS MY K*NC SEAL OF SAID OFFICE

THIS _ L S _ PAY ns
. j

L3(^L.

ALYSCN E. BROWN. CLE9X

_

1fl

Qp

'}

A

.•<••*

In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH

natp

August 16, 1983

Plaintiff
vs.

Case No.
CALVIN GOULD

423

^
f

Judge

GREGORY NESS OLIVER
3 . Jones, Reporter
C. Long, Clerk

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court for hearing on Motion for
New T r i a l with Melvin C Wilson, Esq. appearing as counsel for p l a i n t i f f .
Defendant i s present and represented by Robert Macri, Esq.
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel makes statement to the Court representing
there has been further i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h i s matter, and based upon
that i n v e s t i g a t i o n and copies of confessions of two other p a r t i e s , moves
t o d i s m i s s t h i s case.
Court orders the defendant released from custody of the Utah
State Mr i s on.

Motion granted.

CCUNTY OF DAVIS

)

^ ^ ^ J Sf S ^

THE

AND rUU -*£;J?; Q r.Xj CLERK.

THU3-l£-°AYOF - J 2 S
ALYSONE. BROWN.'

DlsTfUCT

DOCUMENT ON

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T R ^ g £ny/jyyf

§jj[^

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH*© $£j> j9 JJJ JJ. ^j
W C ^ 4 w j 4 ± ? s ! H . CLERK
2so DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH/

8Y-

4A
DEPUTY CLSK

Plaintiff,
ORDER RELEASING EVIDENCE

vs.

Case No.

GREGORY N. OLIVER

Q

4215

Defendant.

The above matter having come before the Court at the
request of the Defendant for an Order releasing evidence and it

JO-

appearing to the Court that the previous conviction having been
set aside and the Information dismissed and all time periods for
appeal having elapsed;
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of
the Court shall release to Gregory Oliver one levi jacket presently
being held in evidence in regards to the above-mentioned case.
Dated this

/£~

• "• i
O-V.-l-*«*••: CLERK 0 = THE DISTRICT
Z"'. " -I." .v. »,; ?OLi.MTV. UTAH !!C HEREBY CeflTt?: - v . i r w . . - , ; ; L £ / C C AMD?CRSGCif!G>SA TRUE
.*;-: rC'-i. ' X i - ' C^ M ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON
File, .-» .*•• Of ".:Oi AS SUCH CLERK.
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE
TMifi-ifl
ruvns
D^<^.,
1 9 2 j ^
J
BY

ALYSCN E. BROWN. CLERK

day of September, 1983.

Appendix 3
(to motion for evidentiary hearing)

1 that time?
2

A

Yes, he did.

3

Q

And did he show you one or more pictures?

4

A

One picture.

5

MS. BYRNE: May I approach the witness, Your

6 Honor?
7

THE COURT: You may.

8

MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, do we need this marked

9

for this hearing, for purposes of this hearing?

10

MR. BROWN:

For purposes of my motion, I would

11 like the picture separated from the others as a'separate
12 exhibit.
13

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: if this matter

14 goes to trial, is the photo array going to be an exhibit?
15

MS. BYRNE: Yes, it will be, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: How are those attached in the folder?

17

MS. BYRNE: I was just checking that here. They

18 seem to be affixed on two sides with Scotch tape.
19

THE COURT: Why don't we do this, why don't we

20 take the picture in question from the photo array and mark
21 it on the back.
22

MS. BYRNE: All right.

23 !

THE COURT: That way, if we need the entire array

24 again we will have a clear record of everything.
25

MS. BYRNE: We are going to use the photo array

228

1

again immediately after this, s o —

2

THE COURT: All right.

Then you can put the

3

individually-marked picture back in, or it can be just

4

loose.

5

MS. BYRNE:

6

MR. BROWN: Yes.
Q

7

You have seen that?

(By Ms. Byrne)

I an showing you what has been

8

narked as State's Exhibit No. 1 for identification.

9

you seen that picture before?

Have

10

THE COURT: Mr. Brown, can. the record reflect

11

that the picture in question is only the picture on the

12

left side as you look at that exhibit, rather than both

13

pictures?

14

MS. BYRNE: Thank you, Your Honor.

15

MR. BROWN: Yes.

16

THE COURT: All right.

17

THE WITNESS: It seens to be the exact picture I

18
19

saw.
Q

MR. BROWN:

20
21
22
23

(By Ms. Byrne) And to the best—
To clear that up, the exact picture

you saw~
MS. BYRNE: That's what I was about to do. But
go ahead, if you would like.

24

MR. BROWN:

Go ahead.

25

MS. BYRNE: Okay.
229

1

Q

(By Ms. Byrne)

So to the best of your

2

recollection, this is a picture that Officer Matthews

3

showed you on January 8?

4

A

Thatfs right.

5

Q

Do you recall what time of day that was?

6

A

Late afternoon, I believe.

7

3:00 to 6:00.

8

than that.

9 I

Q

I'm not really—

Could have been 3:00.

I canft be more precise

At the time Officer Matthews showed you that

10 picture, did he ask you any questions at that time?
11

A

Not that I can recall precisely.

12

Q

Did you make any statement when you saw that

13 picture?
14

A

I believe I said it appears to be.

15

Q

You would have, said it -appears to b e — •- It

16

appears to be?

17 i

A

Yes.

13 I

Q

It appears to be what?

19

A

The individual that I saw the day previously.

Q
At any time after January 8, did he show you any
20
2| I other pictures?
22 i

A

Detective Matthews did not.

23 I

Q

Did another officer show you any pictures?

24 i

A

Yes. Detective Carr showed me a photo spread.

25 I

MS. BYRNE:

For the record, I have taken what was
230

1

marked as State1 s Exhibit Mo, 1 and I have placed it in its

2

original position in the six-picture lineup that has been

3

marked as State's Exhibit No. 2.

4

Q

5

(By Ms. Byrne)

Looking at State's Exhibit No. 2,

do you recognize that?

6 1

A

I recognize it as the defendant?

7

Q

Excuse me?

8

A

I recognize that guy as the defendant.

9 I

Q

Do you recognize that photo spread as a whole?

A

Itfs the same format. I can't say the other

10

Ij J pictures are the same.
12
13

Q

You can't say it's the same one you were shown

before?

14

A

Yes.

But it's the same format.

15

Q

And at the time you were shown the photo spread

13

containing six pictures by another officer, did you at that

17

time pick out a person that you believed to be the one you

"l^jsaw on January 7?
19

A

I did.

20

Q

And what, if any, statement did you make

2i

concerning the identification to the detective who showed

22

you that photo spread?

23

A

That I felt the picture I had identified was the

24 person I'd seen and chased.
25

Q

I'm sorry, you felt that what?
231
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1

A.

2

ft

3
4

I did.
Did he ask any questions about that photograph?

A.

He asked me if that photograph was the individua:

who had burglarized my home.

5

ft

6

Did you make a response to that question?
A.

7

ft

8
ft

The defendant.
I'm sorry, you said it appeared to be what?

10

A.

IT

the defendant.

12

ft

I said the photograph appeared to be that of

Okay.

13

been a defendant.

14

of?

15
16
17
18

I indicated that it appeared to be.

It appeared to be what?
A.

9

Yes.

A.

Well, at that time there would not have
Who did you indicate that was a photograph

I indicated it appeared to be a photograph of

the individual who had burglarized my home.
MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, may we approach the

bench for a moment on a matter of the picture?

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

20

[Bench conference off the record.]

21 I

MS. BYRNE:

If I may have a moment, your Honor.

22

I seem to have misplaced an item of evidence that the next

23

question would be concerning.

24

to take a break for the benefit

If the Court was planning
of the reporter, I wonder

25 I if I could request it be now so I could trot back across

52

1

the street and see if I may have left it on my desk.

2
3

THE COURT:

Well, it's a little bit early.

The

photograph that you have asked him about?

4

MS. BYRNE:

There's another one.

5

THE COURT:

Well, is there any reason why we

6

can't proceed to the next series of questions, then come

^

back to that?

It's at least clear in my mind.

8

MS. BYRNE:

We can.

9

THE COURT:

If we come back in an hour with

10

the picture I, at least, would remember Mr. Spielmans'

11

testimony that he just gave, and I can't assume anything

12

less on the part of the jury.

13

MS. BYRNE:

I'm sorry, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

I'm sure the jury will figure it

15

out.

I just don't want to take a break now.

16
17

MS. BYRNE:

When was the Court planning on taking}

THE COURT:

Probably about quarter to 3:00.

the break?

1*
19

if you finish before then, we can always come back.

20

sure the jury is going to understand, even though it may

21

be out of order a little bit.

22
23
24
25

MS. BYRNE:
Q.

I'm

That's fine.

After the occasion when you looked at this one

picture, were you then shown further pictures after that?
A.

Yes.

Sometime later.

I believe it was a week

53

1

home was burglarized, if you were to see the person that

2

you saw jumping over the fence at the side of your house

3

again, would you be able to recognize that person?

4 I

A.

I would*

5

QL

And is that person in the courtroom today?

6

A.

Yes, he is.

7

ft
k

8
9

And would you point him out for the jury, please?)

table.

10
H

Gentleman in the ski sweater, the defendants

MS. BYRNE:

May the record reflect that he has

identified the defendant, Mr. Greg Oliver?

12

MR. McCAUGHEY:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. McCAUGHEY:

No objection.

The record will so reflect.
And to the best of your recollection

15

is that person that you just identified present at the

16

lineup that you observed?

17

k

Yes.

18 I

Q,

And is that person you picked out in the lineup?

19

A.

It is.

20

QL

And in the photo spread of six individuals that

21

you observed, was the person's picture in that photo lineup?

22 I
23
24
25

A.
ft

It w a s .
And is that the same person you have picked

out in the photo lineup?
A

It is.

58

1 I
2

Your Honor, the State has no further

THE COURT:

Why don f t we take a break now, then

questions.

3
4

MS. BYRNE:

you can run and

—

5

MS. BYRNE:

I was, subject to that.

6

THE COURT:

Members of the jury, we are going

7

to take a break at this time.

During which time Mrs. Byrne

8

will get the pictures she needs.

9

of the Court is to not discuss this matter with anyone,

Remember the admonition

10

including among yourselves, do not form or express any

11

opinions or conclusions.

12

Mrs. Byrne?

And is ten minutes enough,

13

MS. BYRNE:

I hope so, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

15

break to ten minutes if we cam.

We'll try to keep this

See you then.

16

[Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.]

17

THE COURT:

Do you have any jury instructions

19

MS. BYRNE:

I do.

20

THE COURT:

Anything else we need to address?

18

21

for me?

If not, we'll be in recess.

22

Recess

23

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Ms. Byrne.

24

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, Mr. Warner, who I

25

indicated

earlier is an investigator with our office, is

59

1

here now.

I would like to have him with me, if for no other

2

reason, in case I misplace something else during at least

3

the afternoon proceedings.

4

Mr. McCaughey and he has no objection.

5

MR. McCAUGHEY:

6

THE COURT:

I have discussed it with

That's correct, your Honor.

All right.

Members of the jury,

7

Mr. Warner will be *n exception to the exclusionary rule.

8

There is an exception to that, and that is for a witness

9

who is present is necessary to aid counsel in the

10

presentation of the case.

11

exception, and Mr. McCaughey has agreed that he can stay,

12

so he will be with us.

13

Go ahead,

14

MS. BYRNE:

15

0

Mr. Warner appears to fit that

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Spielmans, showing you what's been marked

16

as State's Exhibit 15 for identification, do you recognize

17

that?

18
19

You may want to look on both sides.
A.

This appears to be the photo spread that I was

shown at the sheriff's office.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A

Somewhat more than a week after the event, I

22
23 I
24
25

believe.

And that would have been when?

I don't recall the exact date.
MS. BYRNE:

State would move to have what has

been marked as State's Exhibit 15 introduced into evidence.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

No objection.
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APPENDIX 3
TESTIMONY CONCERNING VALUE OF PROPERTY

1 I for the dial tone to show up in it.

I attempted to dial

2 | but I couldn't get a dial tone, so about the time I was
3 | in my driveway once again, I called 911 again.
4 I

Q.

And did you reach them?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q,

Were you able to give them any additional

7

information?

8

k

9
10
11

Yes.

I gave them a description of the vehicle,

its license number and its direction of travel.
Q.

Okay.

And did some member of the sheriff's

office arrive to take your report from you?

12

k

Yes.

13

Q.

And did you give that person the same descriptioi

14

as you have talked about just now?

15

A.

Yes.

16 I

QL

And did you have an opportunity, either then

17
18

or later, to check further in your house?
A.

Yes.

When the deputy arrived, he asked me if

19

I was missing any property, and I was able to identify some

20

items for him.

21

Q.

What items did you tell him were missing?

22

A.

A watch, a ring, four $1 bills. I believe that

23

was it.

24

Q.

I'm sorry?

25 I

A.

I believe that's all.

Q.

And did you place a value on that watch at that
43

1

time?

2

A.

Yes.

3 1

Q.

Do you recall what it was?

4

I believe I did.

MR. McCAUGHEY:

Your Honor, I object at this

5

time.

I think the value we're talking about is the value

6

he testifies to today, not what he told the police officer.

7
8
9
10
11

THE COURT:
Q.

Sustained.

(By Ms. Byrne)

Speaking at the present time,

do you have an opinion as to the value of that watch?
A.

I secured opinion from a jeweler in regard to

the watch, and he indicated probably

12

MR. McCAUGHEY:

13 I

MS. BYRNE:

—

Objection.

Hearsay.

Well, do you have an opinion as

14

to what the value of that watch is?

15

THE WITNESS:

16

MR. McCAUGHEY:

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

I indicated --

May I voir dire at this point?

You may.

18
19
20
21

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. McCAUGHEY:
Q,

Mr. Spielmans, this opinion you1 re about to

22

give us is based on the value that you received from that

23

jeweler?

24
25

k

Yes.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

I would object, your Honor.
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1

I think it's based on hearsay.

2 1

MS. BYRNE:

Could we clarify that as the value

3

received from the jeweler on the value that the jeweler

4

placed on the watch?

5

question was, Counsel.

6

THE COURT:

7

I'm just not clear about what you're

I don't think he's suggesting that

it was sold.

8

MR. McCAUGHEY:

9

MS. BYRNE:

Excuse me?

10

THE COURT:

I interpret the answer to be that

11

he sold the watch

12

determined value.

13
14

THE WITNESS:

MR. McCAUGHEY:
agent told you.

19

my objection.

20

I don't care what your insurance

That was the end of my question.

THE COURT:

I renew

Mrs. Byrne, do you want to address

the objection?

22

MS. BYRNE:

Well, your Honor, may I further

question the witness to establish one other matter?

24
25

Yes, and from my insurance agent,

the best way to determine the value of the property.

18

23

You're just basing your testimony]

here on what the jeweler told you the watch was worth?

17

21

to the jeweler and therefore are thereby

MR. McCAUGHEY:

15
16

No.

THE COURT:
QL

Sure.

(By Ms. Byrne)

All right.

Did you have an

45

opinion as to what the value of the watch was before you
consulted with a jeweler?
A.

I did.

Q.

When you consulted with the jeweler, did that

change your opinion as to the value of the
k

watch?

Yes.
MS. BYRNE:

Well, your Honor, having received

the answer to those questions, I think what Mr. Spielmans
will tell us is how he valued the watch after adding to
his own information from consulting with a person whose
business is to establish value.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

Which is precisely what we don't

know.
THE COURT:

Well, the ruling of the Court will

be that he's not entitled to testify as to the valuation
given by someone other then him.

He, however, is entitled

to testify of his view of what his property is worth,
unaffected by anything he heard from the jeweler or anyone
else, which, I guess, makes relevant what he believed it
was worth close to the time of the incident but before he
consulted with a jeweler.
So I guess I'm referring to, based on the testimor
and the earlier ruling I made about whether or not he could
testify as to what he indicated to a police officer, its
value.

Maybe the only problem is the question needs to

46

be recharacterized, and that is before he consulted with
the jeweler, what was his estimate of the value of his
property,
MS. BYRNE: All right.
THE COURT:

So the objection, I guess, then,

must be sustained.
MS. BYRNE:
ft

Thank you, your Honor.

At the present time do you have an opinion as

to the value of that watch?
MR. McCAUGHEY:

Well, your Honor, thatfs just

exactly what we're talking about now.

He's going to give

his opinion based on —
THE COURT:

He has testimony that his present

opinion is affected by, if not the same as what the jeweler
said.
MS. BYRNE:

I don't believe he's —

ask him what the jeweler told him it was worth.

I didn't
I'm asking

what his opinion at the present time is as to the value.
THE COURT:

But it's a foundational problem,

is that the only way, since he has indicated that his present
view of value is affected by what the jeweler told him,
he can only testify if he's an expert, and he's the type
of expert that reasonably relies upon a jeweler.

He's not

an expert but he can testify as to his belief as to the
value of his own property.

And he can do so in order to
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1

avoid the foundational problems by stating what that belief

2

was before he consulted the jeweler.

3 I

MS. BYRNE:

Well, I'm sure he could testify

4

to that, your Honor, but at the time time he can testify

5

as to what his present belief is, too, whatever it may be

6

based on, because whatever it is based on, we don't know

7

what it was based on previously.

8
9

THE COURT:

At the same time that

As I understand the Supreme Court

ruling, it doesn't matter what an owner of the property's

10

belief of value is based on.

11

testify as to its value.

12

other than being an owner, such as an owner who consulted

13

with a jeweler, it lacks foundation.

14

MS. BYRNE:

An owner of property can

But if it's based on something

But if it's —

it would still be

15

his opinion, which is what the Supreme Court has said he

16

can testify to, wouldn't it, your Honor?

17
18

21

THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to sustain the

MS. BYRNE:

Thank you.

objection.

19
20

—

Q.

(By Ms. Byrne)

All right.

At the time of the

theft, did you have an opinion as to the value of that watch?

22

A.

Yes, I did.

23

Q.

And what was your opinion as to its value?

24

A.

I believe it was $125.

25

Q.

And I believe you indicated a ring was taken?
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1

k

Yes.

2

Q.

And at the time that the ring was taken, did

3

you have an opinion as to the value of that ring?

4
5

A.

I did have, and whatever that opinion was is

reflected in the police report.

6

QL

Y O U do not recall?

7

k

No.

8 1

ft

I don f t recall.

I S there anything that would help refresh your

9

recollection?

10

A.

Nothing other than the police report, I believe.

11

MR. McCAUGHEY:

12

MS. BYRNE:

13 I

MR. McCAUGHEY:

14 I

MS. BYRNE:

May I approach the witness, your

16

THE COURT:

You may.

17

MS. BYRNE:

If you would care to review that

15

18

20 I

MS. BYRNE:

21

THE WITNESS:

24
25

$100 was the watch and the ring.

for a moment and see if that refreshes your recollection.
THE WITNESS:

23 I

Pardon me?

Honor?

19

22

$100.

You mean the figure on the ring?
Just a second.
I'm —

I'm sorry, what?

Let me ask you if I

understand.
ft

(By Ms. Byrne)

I'm asking you if looking at

the police report refreshes your recollection as to the ring
MR. McCAUGHEY:

As to the ring?
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1

MS. BYRNE:

2

THE WITNESS:

3
4

As to the ring.

Thank you.

I'm sure it reflects what I said.

I just don't recall.
ft

(By Ms. Byrne)

Well, does looking at that report)

5

refresh your recollection as to how you valued the ring

6

at that time?

7

A.

8
9

Oh.

I don't know how I valued it.

I didn't

purchase it.
ft

I understand that, but that's not the question.

10

The question is:

11

report, does that refresh your recollection as to how you

12

valued the ring at that time?

13
14
15

JL
ft

Having looked at this report, this police

Yes.
Okay.

ring at that time?

16

A.

I really can't recall.

17

That's what I said.

18

I said.

19

ft

20

$1 bills.

21
22

What was the value you placed on that

ft

ft

25

house?

That's correct.
Where were those items kept?

A.

24

If it says $200 on there, that's what

I believe you also indicated there were four

A.

23

It states $200 on there.

They were on top of a dresser in my bedroom.
And did you observe any other damage to your
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!

MR. McCAUGHEY:

That's all.

2
3

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

4

BY MS. BYRNE;

5

Q,

I just have one other question.

Mr. Spielmans,

6

you indicated that when you talked to the officer about

7

your losses as a result of this burglary, you indicated

8

a ring and watch and four $1 bills.

9

examination, I heard you mention some additional small items.

I thought, on cross-

10

Was there anything else missing besides the ring and watch

H

and dollars?

12

A.

Yes.

Sometime later, after I filled out my

13

claim, there were four or five gold dollars, Canadian coins

14

I discovered were no longer there.

15

Q.

And what was the value of those?

16

k

Oh, very little.

About 75 cents each.

17

MS. BYRNE:

Thank you.

18

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. McCaughey?

19

MR. McCAUGHEY:

20

THE COURT:

21

I have nothing further.

Nothing further, your Honor.

I'm assuming, Mr. McCaughey, you

want Mr. Spielmans available, if necessary for your case?

22

MR. McCAUGHEY:

23

THE COURT:

That would be fine.

All right.

And can we just arrange,

24

through Mrs. Byrne, if you need him, she could get ahold

25

of him for you?

71

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1989

2

-ooOoo-

3
4

THE COURT:

the defendant is present with his counsel.

5
6

Mrs. Byrne is present on behalf of the State,
the jury is not present.

7
8

The record should indicate that

Mrs. Byrne, it's my understanding that you intend
to rest.

9

MS. BYRNE:

That's correct, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

Then we'll deem you

11

technically rested and at this time, when the jury comes

12

back, if they come back, you should formally rest in front

13

of them on the record.

14 I

MS. BYRNE:

All right.

15

THE COURT:

Mr. McCaughey?

16

MR. McCAUGHEY:

I have a motion to dismiss as

17

to —

I guess it's a motion to dismiss the felony theft,

18

and reduce it to a Class A misdemeanor, and that's based

19

on Mr. Spielmans' value testimony.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. McCAUGHEY:

22

that watch was worth $125.

23

value on the ring.

24

report, testified that did not refresh his recollection,

25

that it says that he testified what the police report

I have totaled it up to $335.
My recollection is he testified
He never testified as to any

He testified that he looked at the police|
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'

indicated.

2

and he never ever testified as to, in his opinion, as to

3

the value of that ring.

4

I think we have $125.

5

I said $200, but I don't remember saying that,

I think he has to do that. So

THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate this,

6

that I agree that at best, from your client's perspective,

1

his testimony was a bit garbled.

8

his testimony on refreshing his recollection, although he

9

did not use the

magic

However, I believe that

words that refresh your recollectior^,

10

that he did confirm that that refreshed his view of the

11

value at the time, the $200. And I was listening to that

12

testimony closely as it came in, and it was right at the

13

end of that submatter that he finally kind of stumbled into

14

it.

15
16
17
18
19

And therefore, the motion will be denied.
I think the question goes to the weight, and

you're certainly able to challenge that in closing argument.
Do you want to put anything on the record about
this witness?
MS. BYRNE:

Yes, your Honor.

I would.

State

20

has intended and has subpoenaed one additional witness,

21

a Mrs. Tina Lehman, on the previous occasion when trial

22

was set back in early July.

23
24
25

THE COURT: After the first continuance and
before the second?
MS. BYRNE:

I could tell you —
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